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Policy makers in the euro area and worldwide have intervened substantially to mitigate the 
economic and social disruptions of the present crisis and to stimulate recovery through various 
(conventional or unconventional) tools of monetary and fi scal policy. 
As regards fi scal policy, there is certainly a strong consensus that government rescue plans for the 
banking sector were needed to avoid a systemic crisis and restore confi dence. A wealth of studies 
by the EC, IMF, OECD and also national bodies have supported this line of action, also in view of the 
experience of past banking crises , most notably in Japan, Korea and the Nordic countries. 
At the same time, fi scal measures to stimulate the economy in the short-run have been advo-
cated by several voices within the economic profession, including international organizations 
and certain governments, and implemented in many countries of the euro area and worldwide. 
On this front, though, the whatever-it-takes approach that might be valid for fi nancial rescue 
plans is usually not fully applicable for demand-oriented discretionary fi scal policy actions.2
First, the need for discretionary fi scal policy measures has to be assessed in conjunction with the 
counter-cyclical stimulus of fi scal policy built into tax and spending systems, i.e. automatic stabi-
lization. Automatic stabilizers are those elements of fi scal policy that operate without any explicit 
government action, and thus are not affected by the implementation lags of discretionary policy. 
In this regard, a direct comparison of the “appropriate” discretionary stimulus in the EU and the 
US would be diffi cult, given the larger size of public sectors in the EU, with more progressive tax 
systems and more responsive social expenditure (in particular unemployment benefi ts).
Second, the affordability of a fi scal stimulus plan depends primarily on an economy’s existing 
fi scal conditions or the degree of fi scal stress, either proxied by a high existing level of govern-
ment debt, a rapid debt increase, or the extent of other long-term risks (such as aging costs). 
It is also likely to depend on the size of its external imbalances, particularly in the case of 
emerging economies. Hence, a country with a high level of foreign debt and/or confronting 
balance of payments problems is likely to have less room for fi scal expansion.
Third, even in the event that indeed discretionary packages were to be implemented, some 
questions remain open to debate: How should they be designed to maximize the impact on 
the economy (fi scal multipliers)? How should measures be tailored, communicated and imple-
mented in order to bolster consumers’ and fi rms’ confi dence and help reduce aggregate un-
certainty in the economy? In the event of the crisis lasting longer than envisaged, some addi-
tional questions could be posed: Would fi scal measures increase the probability of ending a 
recession in addition to mitigating the slump? Would they instead delay the recovery?
Introduction1
1. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the ECB or 
the NCBs involved. The authors would like to thank the participants at the ESCB Working Group on Public Finance meet-
ing of 3-4 March 2009, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. In particular, we would like to thank Karsten Wendorff, Ad van Riet 
and Richard Morris for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.  2. See European Central Bank (2009), Freed-
man et al. (2009), Barrell et al. (2009), OECD (2009), Elmendorf and Furman (2008), or Spilimbergo et al. (2008). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 126 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
This paper reviews the main pros and cons of discretionary fi scal packages trying to unveil what 
we can learn from the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of discretionary 
fi scal policies, while at the same time drawing lessons for the actual packages recently put forward 
in some EU countries. The paper shows that it is extremely diffi cult to elaborate an unambiguous 
catalogue of measures defi ning an “optimal” fi scal package, though much attention has been paid 
in the policy debate to the requirement that measures taken should be “timely, targeted and tem-
porary” (TTT). As regards the duration of measures, both temporary and more persistent measures 
may be defended depending on the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents in the economy, the 
reaction of long-term interest rates, and the expected duration of the adverse shocks hitting the 
economy. Targeting measures to some specifi c agents may be diffi cult in practice, given the un-
certainty surrounding fi scal multipliers and the diffi culties of designing well-targeted fi scal stimulus 
packages. Timeliness is the least controversial criterion in the current situation.
Beyond the discussion on TTT, the literature suggests that the structure of a fi scal stimulus 
plan should take into account several factors, such as: (i) a proper balance between the ex-
pected short-term positive effects (mainly demand-side) with the costs that might be expected 
from the measures (mainly linked to the longer-term, and the supply side, but also to the short-
term via fi nancial markets); (ii) the expected size of fi scal multipliers of various tools available; 
(iii) the degree of openness of the economy; (iv) the need to minimise distortions in market 
mechanisms and, in the case of EU countries, the compliance with single market rules. 
Discretionary fi scal policy measures are usually advocated based on the claim that there are 
short-run benefi ts in the event of a crisis/recession situation. Indeed, several recent studies 
seem to provide evidence that additional government spending and/or tax cuts have a positive 
effect on aggregate output in the short-term in such a situation. What remains to be deter-
mined is the size of the fi scal multipliers, and the sign and size of the disaggregated impact on 
private consumption and private investment.
Private consumption, the biggest component of aggregate demand, has received most of the at-
tention. The current consensus holds that private consumption will increase after a positive govern-
ment spending shock or after temporary tax cuts due to the increase in disposable income.3
The most popular argument usually advocated is that the consumption of liquidity-constrained or 
myopic agents reacts strongly to tax reductions or government spending increases. For example, 
Gali et al. (2007) fi nd that, conditional on having a large enough fraction of rule-of-thumb consum-
ers4 (in their benchmark solutions 50% of the population), and a high degree of price stickiness 
(average duration of about four quarters), a government spending shock in the US generates an 
increase in aggregate consumption even if the latter is not very persistent. Otherwise, the negative 
wealth effect of the expected higher taxation would offset the expansionary impact, a standard 
result in models without liquidity constraints or price and wage stickiness.5 Inverting the previous 
The effectiveness of fi scal 
packages: short-run 
benefi ts and potential 
costs
SHORT-RUN BENEFITS ON 
AGGREGATE OUTPUT
3. See, for example, Gali et al. (2007), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2005, 2007), 
Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Caldara and Kamps (2008) or Afonso and Sousa (2009). At the same time, some papers 
suggest the consumption response to temporary tax cuts may be modest. In this respect, see Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995, 2001), Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999, 2002). Finally, the fi ndings that government spending shocks cause 
private consumption to rise is not unchallenged, e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. 
(2004), or Ramey (2008). See Perotti (2007) for a critical discussion of this latter strand of the literature. Most of the pa-
pers referred to in this footnote analyze the US case. 4. By rule-of-thumb (or liquidity constrained or hand-to-mouth) 
consumers the literature refers to individuals that do not have access to fi nancial markets, and thus consume all of their 
current disposable income each period. 5. Standard “neoclassical” models predict that an exogenous increase in gov-
ernment spending will decrease private lifetime wealth (given that agents anticipate that increases in spending today will 
have to be fi nanced in the future), hence normal goods consumption and leisure declines (hours worked will increase to 
compensate for the negative wealth effect caused). The seminal paper most quoted in this respect is Barro (1974). See 
also Baxter and King (1993). For recent examples of simulation models that incorporate this theoretical structure in an 
otherwise standard “neo-Keynesian” framework see Coenen and Straub (2005) or Coenen et al. (2007). 
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argument on the fraction of constrained/unconstrained agents in the economy, several studies 
that analyse the non-Keynesian effects of fi scal policies claim that fi scal consolidations might have 
expansionary effects on the economy if the fraction of unconstrained agents is high enough.6, 7
Tagkalakis (2008) analyses the link between the fraction of constrained/unconstrained agents 
and the state of the economy. He develops a model to illustrate that the fraction of credit-con-
strained consumers is likely to increase in bad times, and hence a fi scal expansion is more 
likely to have a positive and stronger effect on consumption in economic downturns. This hy-
pothesis is validated in a panel data set of OECD countries for the period 1970-2002.8 
An alternative argument in the literature that rationalizes why private consumption might react 
positively to an increase in government consumption is based on the assumption that public 
and private consumption are complements or, similarly, that they are imperfect substitutes with 
suffi ciently low elasticity of substitution. In both cases the rise in government consumption 
increases the marginal utility of private consumption so that the negative wealth effect on con-
sumption is counteracted.9 Examples of public spending which substitutes private spending 
include defence, public order and justice, while public spending in education or health might 
be perceived as complements for private sector provided services.
Private investment, a much more cyclically volatile component of output, may also be infl u-
enced by tax and government spending. The incentive to invest is responsive to tax policy and 
is likely to be more responsive when tax measures are perceived to be temporary (in this re-
spect see for example Auerbach and Hassett, 2002). The rationale is the following. Firms and 
investors are sensitive to changes over the coming period in the tax-adjusted price of new 
capital goods, and may be motivated to accelerate purchases into this year if a favourable tax 
environment is expected to become less favourable. This might be particularly the case in the 
presence of capital stock adjustment costs, as expectations of future changes in the incentive 
to use capital in production lead to immediate changes in investment so as to minimize the 
adjustment costs incurred in closing the gap between the current and future desired capital 
stocks. Thus, temporary tax credits may have more than proportional impact on the user cost 
of capital. 
Most empirical studies on temporary investment incentives fi nd that they tend to be only mod-
erately effective (see, for example, CBO, 2008, and the literature cited there). This may be due 
to the fact that investment projects often require long planning phases and, consequently, only 
projects that have already been planned can be implemented in the short term. 
Standard models without liquidity constraints or price and wage stickiness would predict a 
boost in investment after a government spending shock given that, to compensate for the 
negative wealth effect caused, agents might decide to work more, which in turn will raise the 
return to capital. Nevertheless, other arguments would signal that a positive government 
6. On the assumption of credit market imperfections and the link to constrained and unconstrained individuals, see At-
tanasio (1999), Perotti (1999), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) or Giavazzi, Jappeli and Pagano (2000). Also on the 
issue of the “non-Keynesian” effects of fi scal policies see Schclarek (2007) and the references quoted therein. 7. Mona-
celli and Perotti (2008) exploit an alternative channel. They set up a standard business cycle model, except for the pres-
ence of price rigidity, and fi nd a positive response of private consumption to a government spending shock for prefer-
ences consistent with an arbitrarily small positive wealth effect on labour supply, that counterbalances the standard 
wealth effect. This effect is linked to the degree of complementarity between consumption and hours. See also Ravn, 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe (2006). 8. This adds to the usual argument that expansionary fi scal policy is more effi cient 
when the output gap is negative because otherwise it could only boost infl ation (see Henry et al., 2004). 9. See for 
example Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) and Ganelli and Tervala (2009) for theoretical justifi cations and empirical evidence 
on the complementarities argument, and Linneman and Schabert (2004) for the imperfect substitution one. At the end of 
the day, the issue of whether private and public consumption are complements or substitutes is an empirical one.  
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spending shock might lead to a situation in which private investment is crowded out by higher 
public debt issuance, if the latter raises the interest rate (this will depend on current and future 
monetary policy).10 In addition, if the government spending shock is implemented through the 
public sector wage bill, upward wage pressures may appear in the economy, leading to a re-
duction in profi ts and thus private investment (see Alesina et al. 2002, Lane and Perotti, 2003, 
and Ardagna, 2007, for theory and empirics supporting this claim).
The implementation of discretionary fi scal packages is not without risks. The main costs usu-
ally spelled out in the literature as regards short-term policies are long-run costs. These are 
usually framed against the dangers that strong discretionary actions may generate for the 
sustainability of public fi nances.11
In addition, if long-run costs are perceived by private agents to be relevant in a given historical 
episode, then precautionary savings may increase and investment may decrease or remain 
muted, provided that agents perceive that a fi scal consolidation might be needed once the 
economic crisis is over (or even before, if the slump turns out to be enduring). This perception 
is likely to depend on the existing degree of “fi scal stress”, either proxied by high existing levels 
of government debt, a rapid debt increase, or the extent of the long-term risks perceived (such 
as aging costs or implicit liabilities related to government guarantees e.g. for fi nancial institu-
tions). These factors might severely limit the short-term impact of fi scal measures.
Discretionary fi scal actions can also have short-run costs. Bearing in mind default risk, increas-
ing or perceived-as-unsustainable government debt can lead to a risk premium being charged 
on the interest on government debt, leading to a crowding-out of private investment. A credi-
ble one-off increase in government spending could – given a suffi cient number of rule-of-
thumb consumers in the economy – bring about positive fi scal multipliers. However, if eco-
nomic agents do not believe that the fi scal stimulus is a one-off (or if it truly is a permanent 
stimulus), the risk premiums could increase accordingly because unconstrained Ricardian 
households want compensation for potential future income losses. This would generate a 
negative fi scal multiplier (see for example Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, or Alesina and Perotti, 
1997). 
An additional short-run consideration pertains to the link between fi scal policy and uncertainty. 
Automatic stabilizers, to the extent that they operate properly, can lower volatility and uncer-
tainty in the economy, without introducing new policy uncertainties (Auerbach and and Has-
sett, 2002, Andrés et al., 2008). This is not necessarily the case as regards discretionary fi scal 
policy actions. In this respect, random fi scal policies could increase the overall economic un-
certainty, and thus damage economic activity.12 As the impact of different measures might 
depend on expectations about the future, fi scal stimulus packages announced clearly and 
credibly are likely to be more effective.13 Without a credible strategy, the government may only 
increase the uncertainty in the system and induce fi rms and households to postpone their 
spending decisions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). A related issue is the anticipation of fi scal 
measures by private agents. Hoon and Phelps (2008) show that under imperfect competition 
an unanticipated temporary labor tax cut to be effective on a given future date fi nanced by 
future cuts in spending is neutral for output in a Ricardian world but contractionary in a non-
Ricardian world. They also show that a sudden expectation of future labour tax cuts without a 
LONG-RUN COSTS, SHORT-RUN 
COSTS AND OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS
10. From an empirical point of view, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) fi nd in a SVAR framework for the US a negative impact 
on private investment of a government spending shock. 11. See for example Afonso et al. (2009). For the trade-off 
between automatic stabilisation and the long-run fi scal positions of governments see Hiebert et al. (2009). 12. See 
Furceri (2008). 13. For example, if agents face a signal extraction problem as regards the prevailing and the expected 
fi scal regime. See Keen (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2008) or Davig (2004) in this respect.  
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sunset provision, with spending gradually adjusting to ensure fi scal sustainability, is expansion-
ary in a Ricardian world but (for small tax changes) contractionary in the time period before 
implementation in a non-Ricardian world.14 Thus, even if ex-post multipliers were positive, the 
fi nal impact of the labour tax cuts would have to be weighted against the ex-ante losses.
The effectiveness of fi scal packages is also likely to depend on the openness of the economy 
and external linkages. In a small and open economy, the share of additional consumption de-
mand resulting from a short-term increase in transfers that is going into imports is conceivably 
high. Therefore, unless fi scal stimulus packages are perfectly coordinated internationally (eve-
ryone spends), more open economies may be inclined to prefer public investment programs, 
in which they are better able to direct the demand impact towards domestic goods and serv-
ices and thus raise employment. IMF (2008) simulations show that, in general, fi scal multipliers 
tend to be lower in smaller and more open economies. However, in terms of the different fi scal 
tools, the multipliers for labour taxes fall by less (maybe not always be the case if also large 
openness of the labour market, see case of Luxembourg), followed by government invest-
ment, while the highest relative decline is found for transfers.
In addition, the impact of income tax changes on labour supply and output depends on insti-
tutional factors of the labour market, such as the degree of unionisation and other features of 
the wage-setting process. Other factors, such as corruption and preparedness of the govern-
ment institutions (effi ciency of spending line-ministries versus tax collection agencies; availabil-
ity of resources for public institutions and capacity to implement large scale investment pro-
grams), could conceivably infl uence the effectiveness of spending versus tax measures, most 
notably in developing countries.
An argument that is sometimes absent from theoretical studies, and certainly from empirical 
ones, is that the effectiveness of fi scal packages depends crucially on the way they are fi -
nanced. The literature signals that fi scal packages are not generally self-fi nancing. For exam-
ple, the impact of an increase in government spending depends on whether it is fi nanced by a 
future tax rise (or a future spending cut) or by a more persistent increase in government debt 
(the latter being the case of most packages currently announced in the EU), as private agents 
respond differently. As an example, Leeper and Yang (2008) fi nd that the expansionary effects 
of a tax cut (in the long-run, but also in the transition to a new steady-state) depend crucially 
on the choice of which fi scal instrument adjusts and on the magnitude of the adjustment in 
response to a deteriorating budget. The stronger is the response to the deteriorating budget, 
the less debt accumulates, and the more favourable are the expansionary effects of a tax 
cut.15 Thus, especially in countries with high levels of public debt, this strand of the literature 
tends to suggest that a given package should be accompanied by a related set of reverting 
measures, also in view of sustainability issues. 
Another consideration is the consistency of fi scal packages with monetary policy. Monetary 
policy reaction plays a key role in the effectiveness of a fi scal stimulus,16 the output re-
14. On different grounds, and from a purely empirical point of view, Ramey (2008) incorporates the timing of the news 
about future increases in government war spending, while Blanchard and Perotti (2002) incorporate future values of the 
fi scal shocks. Both empirical studies fi nd a larger and longer positive response of output to the fi scal stimulus than found 
in studies using actual spending. Such controls can capture the behavioural change from the moment the fi scal stimulus 
has been credibly announced or approved to the moment of the actual implementation. The response of private con-
sumption to fi scal shocks once the anticipation effects are taken into account is still controversial in the literature. 15. For 
additional illustrations, in a different modelling framework, see Ardagna (2007). 16. It is also a crucial assumption in 
simulation models and, if omitted, it may be an important source of bias in estimating the size of fi scal multipliers in re-
gression analyses. By type of fi scal tools, recent IMF simulation work (IMF, 2008) shows that the output response to la-
bour tax cuts is less affected by monetary accommodation in comparison with other tools (e.g. government investment, 
consumption taxes or transfers), due to the impact on labour supply. 
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sponse being considerably higher and more persistent in the case of monetary accommo-
dation. Ideally, monetary and fi scal policies are consistent in the short run so that their im-
pact on aggregate demand is cumulative and not offsetting. In the current situation of 
expansionary monetary and fi scal policies, risks may arise that the impact of one policy 
forces the other to adjust in the medium term, thus limiting its margin of manoeuvre and 
desirable design. For instance, if private debt remains high and public debt keeps on in-
creasing due to stimulus and rescue plans, interest rates might be pushed up in the me-
dium term.
Finally, expansionary policies might be diffi cult to reverse. An inadequate timing in the re-
versal of the policy mix could endanger growth and infl ation developments in the medium 
term. For example, if expansionary policies are reversed too late European economies may 
have to face excess liquidity (maybe implying new bubbles in other asset prices), unsustain-
able public fi nances, and lack of confi dence among private agents, which could endanger 
the recovery of consumption, investment and output in the medium term. The opposite might 
be also true: if expansionary policies are reversed too early, this could choke off an incipient 
recovery. 
The above review of the literature indicates that the design of fi scal measures may have a 
signifi cant infl uence on their effectiveness. Taking this into account, policy institutions have 
called for stimulus measures to be timely (enacted rapidly), temporary and targeted (directed 
where the multipliers are larger). Example is the “European Economic Recovery Plan” (EERP). 
Meanwhile, in the United States, government offi cials have argued that a “speedy, substantial 
and sustained” fi scal stimulus should fi t better, given the intensity and expected duration of the 
current crisis.
As regards timeliness, important lags can result between the diagnosis of the economic situa-
tion and the decision and implementation of fi scal policies (inside lags). Given these “inside 
lags” and the time needed for the measure to infl uence aggregate demand (“outside lags”), the 
impact of stimulus measures could come too late, when the cyclical position of the economy 
has already begun to improve17. This implies favouring simple measures instead of radical 
departures from current tax and expenditure structures, which may incur large lags associated 
with the process of political discussion and approval of new measures. In the particular case 
of public investment, the pressure to introduce timely measures may result in ineffi cient projects 
with little impact on short- and long-term output growth.
The effects of discretionary fi scal measures depend also on their expected duration (temporary 
vs permanent/sustained measures). As discussed above, the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture is controversial. Rule-of-thumb consumers would react to temporary measures, given that 
they spend all their current income. However, if the fraction of unconstrained agents is high 
enough then temporary increases in income will not lead to signifi cant increases in consump-
tion, as they only affect permanent income marginally. In this latter case, on the contrary, per-
sistency measures may result in higher multipliers if agents optimize over a fi nite number of 
periods.18
The preference for temporary measures is designed to allay concerns about fi scal sustainabil-
ity in the long term. A permanent or persistent stimulus could raise doubts about the long-run 
The effectiveness of fi scal 
packages and their design
TARGETED, TIMELY AND 
TEMPORARY?
17. Although, the diagnosis might be easier in the current crisis and therefore the inside lag shorter. 18. But even in this 
case, private agents may adopt some consumption smoothing when there are fi scal rules that limit the government debt 
and defi cit ratios. For example, if the fi scal defi cit is close to the threshold established by the rule, private agents may 
adjust their saving behaviour anticipating the fi scal adjustment. 
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fi scal position, resulting in the crowding out of private investment through higher interest rates. 
Moreover, the literature on the quality of public fi nances, by stressing the negative relationship 
between government size and economic growth, at least beyond a certain minimal size, adds 
weight to the argument that spending increases should be temporary (EC, 2008). Finally, tran-
sitory measures can also work by affecting the relative prices of present and future consump-
tion and investment. For example, a temporary reduction in VAT rates reduces the price of 
present consumption relative to future spending, boosting demand in the current period (but 
depressing it afterwards). 
Focusing the stimulus on sectors with higher multipliers and towards agents with a higher 
propensity to spend current income, would raise its impact (targeted).19 However, deciding 
which agents are eligible is controversial, especially when diverse sectors of the economy are 
affected, as in the current crisis. There is a risk that measures would be directed towards 
prominent sectors of the economy, on the basis of their visibility and political clout, rather than 
on the effective stimulus to demand. Moreover, national assistance to some specifi c sectors 
could distort competition rules and the functioning of the European single market. In addition, 
in a situation where fi scal multipliers are uncertain, it could be more prudent to rely on a diver-
sifi ed set of measures20. For example, against a background of uncertainty and tight credit 
conditions, fi rms might not undertake risky investments, even if corporate tax cuts reduce 
capital costs.
Given that the current fi scal packages aim at counteracting an aggregate shock that affects 
most economies, a majority of institutions has also stressed that coordinated actions would be 
desirable to reinforce individual national actions by reducing concerns about leakages through 
imports that are not compensated by the induced demand of fi scal packages in trade part-
ners. Trade spillovers and trade multipliers could potentially amplify the impact of fi scal stimu-
lus. At the same time, large scale actions by a broad set of governments, especially in the euro 
area, might lead to competition in the bond market, and increased borrowing costs, espe-
cially for non-core EU countries.
Apart from theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence supporting alternative theories, 
it is important to be able to quantify the multipliers associated with alternative fi scal measures 
to assess the degree of effectiveness of fi scal activism21. The literature (mainly focused on the 
US case) suggests that fi scal multipliers are on average positive, but many studies fi nd that 
they are quite low, and are typically estimated with a high uncertainty. This pertains to both 
expenditure and revenue stimulus measures.22 In this respect, the size of the (short- and 
medium-term) multipliers attached to different types of measures remains an open empirical 
question.
Nevertheless, some general conclusions could be drawn from the literature, presented in Ta-
bles 1, 2 and 3, and are summarized below.
COORDINATION VS. COUNTRY 
ACTIONS 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL 
PACKAGES: WHAT DO WE KNOW 
ABOUT TAX AND SPENDING 
MULTIPLIERS?
19. Notice that throughout this note we are ignoring measures aimed specifi cally at the fi nancial system, which, in the 
current situation, could be a prominent example of well-targeted discretionary measures. Another usually quoted exam-
ple is transfers to low-income households, that despite an expected short-term impact if they are well targeted (and if the 
target group is large enough), may have a negative impact on longer term growth by creating distortions in the allocation 
of resources (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998, Checherita, Nickel and Rother, 2009). 20. Targeting might still be more appropri-
ate in very specifi c cases (i.e. lower income households). 21. It is important to mention at this stage that the authors 
have developed a much more detailed version of this paper with country specifi c fi les that describe impact of the largest 
recently adopted fi scal stimulus measures on different economic variables. Unfortunately, due to the confi dentiality rea-
sons these results cannot be presented in this paper. However, feel free to contact the country specifi c author for the 
country specifi c data. 22. In some cases multipliers could turn out to be negative. Take the example of a small open 
economy with fi scal sustainability problems. In this case, fi scal activism could be damaging for short-term aggregate 
output, and hurt fi scal sustainability. 
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5.074.0-62.0*+*+*+*+0002-0691)2002(ittoreP
1.094.0-71.0+*–*–*+0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
*+*+*+*+6991-5691)1002(ireN
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 1995-2000 +* +* +* + 0.2 1.3
0.32.0*+*++5002-7491)7002(remoRdnaremoR
Romer and Bernstein (2009) 2009-2014 0.00/0.66 1.0
Germany
2.02.0+*+*+*+0002-1691)2002(ittoreP
4.00.0*++*+–0002-0891)2002(ittoreP
*+*+1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
France
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Italy
*–*–1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
Spain
––1002-1891)2002(onillecraM
de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) – – – +*
United Kingdom
2.0-1.0-*–*––*–0002-0691)2002(ittoreP
Japan
8.485.1/61.0*+*++)2002(nesoPdnarenttuK
Pool of countries
WEO (2008) 1947-2007b 0.10 0.1
Advanced economies 0.0 0.4
Emerging economies 0.1 0.2
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors, with input from Henry et al (2004) and De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008). 
* Significance at the 95% level.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM VAR STUDIES TABLE 1
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Expenditure shock
United States
1.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
8.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.9 1.1
Increase in transfers to household 0.5 0.8
Euro Area
1.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.05.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
6.13.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
0.11.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)e()7002(vorakahcTdnabuartS
Increase in Gov. Invest. 1.2 1.1
Germany
2.0-1.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.05.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
7.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
2.18.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)h()4002(ittoreP
Increase in Gov. Invest. 3.7 3.7
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
France
2.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.02.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
8.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
7.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.7
Italy
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.09.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
0.03.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)c()3002(notxaLdnatnuH
1.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
2.12.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
7.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.7
Spain
1.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
9.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
United Kingdom
1.0-2.0.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
0.00.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)f()4002(dleVt'nidnaregeoR
2.01.0slaudividniotsrefsnarT)g()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
7.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)h()4002(ittoreP
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.0 -0.4
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in 
a very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. MULTIMOD model.
d. National Central Banks' models.
e. NAWM (New Area-Wide model). 
f. QUEST model.
g. NIGEM model.
h. VAR model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. EXPENDITURE SHOCKS TABLE 2
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Expenditure shock
Japan
5.07.1.snoC.voGniesaercnIDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
8.07.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.9 1.1
Increase in transfers to household 0.5 0.8
Belgium
9.00.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Luxembourg
3.06.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Austria
3.13.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Portugal
0.12.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
Finland
0.02.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
5.04.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.3 0.5
Netherlands
8.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
Greece
4.17.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
6.05.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.8 1.0
Increase in transfers to household 0.4 0.6
Ireland
9.01.1.snoC.voGniesaercnI)d()5002(nagroMdnanagaF
4.03.0.snoC.voGniesaercnI)b()9002(DCEO
Increase in Gov. Invest. 0.7 0.9
Increase in transfers to household 0.2 0.4
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. MULTIMOD model.
d. National Central Banks' models. 
e. NAWM (New Area-Wide model).
f. QUEST model.
g. NIGEM model.
h. VAR model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. EXPENDITURE
SHOCKS (cont'd)
TABLE 2
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Revenue shock
United States
Dalsgaard et al. (2001) (a) Sustained cut in PIT (Personal Income Tax) 0.6 0.3
5.03.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
3.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Euro Area
2.05.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Germany
3.05.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
2.05.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
3.13.0xatetaroproC
2.07.0sexatlanosreptceriD
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
France
2.03.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
5.02.0xatetaroproC
2.03.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Italy
2.02.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
6.02.0xatetaroproC
2.01.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Spain
1.02.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
3.02.0xatetaroproC
1.02.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
United Kingdom
2.03.0sexattceridnI)c()5002(llerraBdnadyE-lA
6.01.0xatetaroproC
2.02.0sexatlanosreptceriD
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Japan
4.04.0TIPnitucdeniatsuSDalsgaard et al. (2001) (a)
5.03.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
3.02.0xaTtceridnInituC
Belgium
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC)b()9002(DCEO
Luxembourg
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Austria
3.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Portugal
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. NIGEM model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. REVENUE SHOCKS TABLE 3
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Multiplier
mreTmuideMmreTtrohSnoitalumiS
Revenue shock
Finland
3.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Netherlands
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Greece
4.02.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
2.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
Ireland
2.01.0TIPnituC)b()9002(DCEO
1.01.0xaTtceridnInituC
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors.
a. OECD INTERLINK model. Nominal exchange rates and real interest rates are assumed fixed. 
b. DSGE Model. Luxembourgish figures provided by the OECD INTERLINK model are not presented in a 
very transparent way and therefore one should be very cautious when interpreting these. According to 
the latest available information, Luxembourg and Belgium were modelled as a single country.
c. NIGEM model.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY FROM SIMULATION MODELS. REVENUE 
SHOCKS (cont'd)
TABLE 3
Many empirical studies fi nd that spending multipliers are higher than tax multipliers in the short 
term. This result could be rationalized as being consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
part of the higher disposable income from a tax cut is saved, while government purchases of 
goods and services affect aggregate demand directly.23
The cumulative effect of tax measures usually grows with time, but the evidence that tax cuts 
are more effective than spending increases is mixed, especially when tax changes are tempo-
rary. Nevertheless, IMF (2008) shows evidence from a wide panel of fi scal policy responses to 
economic downturns suggesting that revenue-based policies, including temporary ones, were 
associated with higher subsequent growth and even faster recoveries, the latter particularly in 
emerging economies. On balance, it seems that there is more evidence, especially from recent 
narrative studies and simulation exercises that tax multipliers may be high – and higher than 
spending multipliers – in the longer run.
Increases in government purchases of goods and services are found to work faster than other 
spending components, particularly in times of recession and low capacity utilisation, as they 
induce an immediate positive impact on aggregate demand. However, in the longer term, the 
distortions induced in the economy are likely to result in a negative or, at best, insignifi cant 
impact (as shown by most simulation exercises).
Government capital spending is generally considered to have a smaller short-term impact due 
to the long lags associated with the approval and implementation of new projects, but a larger 
long-term impact by raising the capital stock and potential output (Roeger and in‘t Veld, 
2004). Capital spending on maintenance works has the potential for a fast impact on demand 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
MULTIPLIERS VS. TAX 
MULTIPLIERS
BEYOND AGGREGATE 
“GOVERNMENT SPENDING OR 
TAX SHOCKS” 
23. See, among others, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US, Perotti (2002) who found this was the case during 1961-
2000, but not for 1980-2000, Kuttner and Posen (2002) for Japan, IMF (2008) for advanced economies. Burriel et al. 
(2009) for the euro area aggregate, Dalsgaard, André and Richardson (2001) for the US, euro area, Germany and Japan, 
de Castro and Hernandez de Cos (2008) for Spain, Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy, and Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolf 
(2007) for Germany. 
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and a positive medium-term impact on the supply side. Despite the variety of results across 
countries, regions, sectors, or periods of time, the predominant view in the empirical literature 
is that public capital has a positive impact on long-term growth. However, this impact may be 
nonlinear (with lower returns after a certain threshold is reached), and thus it may have re-
ceded in recent years compared to earlier decades (Romp and DeHaan, 2005).
Coming to the impact of different measures aiming at affecting private sector income, income 
tax cuts are generally found to be more effi cient in the long term by eliminating distortions in 
the labour market and raising labour supply. In simulations, Coenen, McAdam and Straub 
(2007) fi nd that the short-term output impact is larger for a government spending shock than 
for a transfer shock, while the positive long-term impact of cuts in the tax wedge is sizably 
larger than the impact of both government consumption and transfers. Al-Eyd and Barrell 
(2005) conclude that personal income taxes have a larger impact than transfers in both the 
short and the medium term.
On the spending side, investment tax credits show high multipliers, as shown in, for example 
Roeger and in ‘t Veld (2004) and Auerbach and Hassett (2002). 
As regards the fi scal multipliers associated with other tax instruments, the comparable em-
pirical literature is scarcer. Al-Eyd and Barrell (2005) fi nd that personal income taxes have the 
largest short-term multiplier in Germany and France, corporate taxes in Italy, while indirect 
(consumption) taxes have a very large short-term multiplier in the UK. Corporate taxes have 
the largest medium-term multiplier across all countries under study. Similarly, in the long term, 
Arnold (2008) fi nds that corporate taxes have the largest impact on output per capita, followed 
by personal income tax and consumption tax.
Two fi nal issues are worth mentioning. First, as signalled in IMF (2008), fi scal multipliers tend 
to be lower in countries with high public debt burdens and high indebtedness vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world, along the lines of the theoretical considerations discussed above.
Second, almost all empirical studies implicitly impose symmetry, in the sense that they are 
performed for complete samples that encompass both upturns (with fi scal tightening) and 
downturns (with fi scal stimulus) together. This implies that estimated multipliers are averages 
over episodes that could potentially be dramatically different (as the literature on “non-Keyne-
sian” effects of fi scal policies shows). In addition, standard linear techniques might not capture 
accurately potential non-linearities arising for these reasons. Two remarkable exceptions point 
in different directions. On the one hand, the above-mentioned work by Tagkalakis (2008) mod-
els good and bad times explicitly, fi nding that a fi scal expansion is more likely to have a positive 
and stronger effect on consumption in economic downturns, with average “OECD spending 
multipliers” signifi cantly above 1. On the other hand, IMF (2008) only look at downturns, and 
fi nd that fi scal activism always makes them worse (and all the more so if public debt is high).
In the light of the discussion of previous sections, this section focuses on the evaluation of 
concrete fi scal measures that have been implemented or are under discussion in the context 
of the current recession in EU member states. As a yardstick against which these measures 
are assessed some of the criteria developed in previous sections (and widely acknowledged in 
the literature) are used. As mentioned before: (i) timely: Is the measure effective by the time a 
stimulus to the economy is needed most? In this respect the time lags involved in decision-
making, implementation and impact on the economy are important; (ii) temporary: Does the 
measure create an expansive fi scal impulse only for as long as the production potential is un-
derutilized?; (iii) targeted: Does the measure have a relatively strong multiplier effect?
OTHER ISSUES: FISCAL 
MULTIPLIERS IN HIGH DEBT 
COUNTRIES, AND IN GOOD AND 
BAD TIMES
Evaluation of specifi c 
fi scal measures to 
stimulate the economy
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING 
DIFFERENT FISCAL POLICY 
MEASURES
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 138 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2009 PROS AND CONS OF VARIOUS FISCAL MEASURES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY
In addition to these “TTT-criteria” it is also important that the respective measure does not 
confl ict with other economic policy objectives (e.g. fi scal sustainability, long-term economic 
growth, functioning of the market mechanism, desired income and wealth redistribution). This 
should also be taken into account when assessing the stimulus measures.
As discussed above, the suitability of a specifi c fi scal measure to stimulate economic activity 
in a severe recession depends on its precise form and on a number of other specifi c factors. 
For example, a measure that usually has a high multiplier effect can have a low or even nega-
tive impact on economic activity if fi scal sustainability is already severely impaired to begin 
with. Other country-specifi c circumstances like institutional factors and the capacity utilisation 
in different sectors of the economy also play an important role. Here instead the focus is only 
on general characteristics of some more important fi scal measures. 
Since not all specifi c measures taken by EU countries can be covered here – the EU identifi ed 
more than 350 government actions by the end of January 2009 – only those measures that 
have a large size and/or have been adopted by a number of member states are considered. 
On the revenue side, this is mainly the case for permanent reductions of personal income tax 
and frontloading of VAT refunds, while the main expenditure measures include increases in 
government investment, subsidies for purchases of consumer durables, per-capita transfers/
tax rebates and higher benefi ts connected to temporary working time reductions.
1 Permanent reductions of personal income tax24 have been taken or announced 
by a number of countries recently, namely Germany, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland or Malta. They may be implemented in a timely manner although adjust-
ing withholding tax payments might take some time on the side of employers 
and some time might elapse before private households increase consumption 
(outside lag). However, this measure is not temporary and thus the expansionary 
effect would not be limited to the period of the downturn. A permanent reduc-
tion is especially costly from a fi scal perspective and implies a large deterioration 
of the long-term sustainability of public fi nances. The multiplier effect of this 
measure is low in general, because a large part of personal income tax is paid 
by households with a relatively low marginal propensity to consume. It could, 
however, be increased somewhat by targeting the cut to households with lower 
incomes (e.g. by increasing individual tax allowances or cutting rates only for 
lower tax brackets). 
2 Frontloading of VAT refunds: The effectiveness of this measure depends crucially 
on the capability of tax authorities to advance the payment of VAT returns. If pay-
ment lags can indeed be shortened, additional liquidity would be provided to 
fi rms. The multiplier effect therefore hinges on the share of credit-constrained 
fi rms in the economy, likely to be high in the current circumstances. If this share 
is small the expansionary impact on the economy may be rather limited as the 
gains from interest savings will be marginal in most cases. In countries facing a 
severe credit crunch, however, some expansionary impact seems likely. Public 
fi nances will deteriorate only temporarily. In fact, the defi cit would not be affected 
at all in case of a strict accrual recording. However, a permanent detrimental ef-
fect on the government balance could arise if there is an increase in the number 
of fi rms that receive refunds but become insolvent before fi nal tax settlements are 
EVALUATION OF MAIN FISCAL 
MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN THE 
CURRENT CONTEXT
24. Note that permanent reduction of personal income tax is not necessarily a crisis measure but has been used by some 
countries as it was already planned before the crisis. 
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paid. Measures of this type have been adopted in a number of countries, in par-
ticular France, Italy and Spain.
3 Many governments have decided to increase government capital spending, among 
them Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Luxembourg and Italy. Government in-
vestment spending, particularly on maintenance works, has the potential for a rela-
tively high short-term multiplier as the state directly creates demand and there are 
therefore no leakages in the form of saving, at least initially. Moreover, the import 
ratio for construction projects is likely to be comparatively low. In addition, this in-
strument is appealing because there appears to be no confl ict with long-run growth 
objectives as potential growth might even be increased.25 However, a major draw-
back is that such measures involve long lags associated with deciding, planning 
and implementing additional investment projects (especially infrastructure), so that 
the multiplier is usually higher in the medium to longer term jeopardising the timeli-
ness of the effects. Even for projects that have already been planned and approved, 
the construction phase often lasts several quarters. Therefore, there is a danger of 
partially procyclical effects unless the additional investment is restricted to moveable 
capital goods and small construction projects (maintenance investment) which can 
be completed in the short run and the downturn is expected to be protracted. In 
addition, there is a risk of price increases if sizeable government demand leads to 
capacity constraints in the respective sector. Finally, an effi cient public administra-
tion is needed to avoid investment in projects that are wasteful from a welfare per-
spective. In federal countries in particular, an effective coordination between differ-
ent layers of government is necessary. 
4 Temporary subsidies for consumer durables might bring forward private demand 
during a recession and therefore can have a particularly high multiplier. The time 
limit on the subsidy strengthens the effect as it lowers the price of current as op-
posed to future consumption. While free-rider effects – payments to consumers 
who would have purchased the product at the time anyway – are inevitable, they still 
have some effect as disposable income is increased in these cases as well.26 How-
ever, consumer durables (e.g. cars) tend to have a relatively high import ratio. More-
over, unwanted price reactions instead of the desired volume effects become more 
likely with narrower subsidised product groups, higher subsidy and higher capacity 
utilisation in the industry concerned. While the measure is timely and temporary it 
leads to relative price distortions and associated welfare losses. Moreover, subsi-
dies for a specifi c industry might prevent necessary structural adjustments, and 
lead to increased pressures from lobbying groups to introduce additional distortions 
affecting the playing fi eld for international competition. Measures to support certain 
industries, like the car industry, have been adopted in a number of countries, among 
which are Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg and Italy.
5 Per-capita transfers/tax rebates: Depending on the specifi c form that this instru-
ment takes it can have quite different effects. For example, whereas in Spain all 
25. However, it can be argued that in the absence of distortions introduced by the political decision-making process the 
optimal amount of public investment was already planned before the downturn and that therefore any additional invest-
ment is likely to be welfare decreasing. According to this reasoning in the long run the level of public investment should 
not be increased and only the timing of this investment should be adapted to cyclical conditions (advance expenditure to 
period of recession). 26. While we are not aware of any studies on how car subsidies (eg scrapping subsidies) affect 
the savings ratio and GDP growth with regard to the automobile sector there is some evidence that the sector is stimu-
lated in the short run but then experiences a downturn (Licandro and Sampayo, 2005, and Adla and Cooper 1997).
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labour income recipients will receive a transfer for an unspecifi ed number of 
years, in Germany the transfer is of a one-off nature and limited to households 
with children. In Italy it is limited to low-income families with children. In general, 
the effectiveness of the transfers increases with the degree of concentration on 
credit-constrained households with a low savings ratio. Evidence for the US 
(Agarwal, Liu, Souleles 2007 and Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006) suggests 
a limited size of the multiplier of tax rebates. The timeliness of the implementation 
of the transfer depends on administrative issues. In the US in 2001 it took around 
ten weeks for tax rebates to be distributed. In case of a one-off transfer the im-
pact of the measure is strictly temporary.
6 Higher benefi ts connected to temporary working time reductions, like the ones 
made in Germany or the Netherlands, can be implemented in a timely manner but 
outside lags – as with all measures aiming to support purchasing power of house-
holds – can delay the impact on the economy. Given that temporary working time 
reductions are highly cyclical, the impact is likely to be concentrated on the pe-
riod of the economic downturn. Moreover, the multiplier could be rather high as 
employees eligible for this transfer could have a high marginal propensity to con-
sume. However, if the benefi ts accrue mainly to fi rms then any short-term impact 
on economic activity is likely to be smaller. The measure might reduce fi ring and 
(re-)hiring costs of fi rms and prevent a loss of fi rm-specifi c human capital but also 
help to avoid or alleviate the hysteresis phenomenon (structural unemployment). 
However, in the absence of market failure it remains unclear why an additional 
incentive by the government is needed since a profi t-maximising fi rm can be ex-
pected to take these costs into account anyhow. Moreover, subsidised tempo-
rary working-time reductions imply the risk that necessary structural adjustments 
are postponed as employees are locked into industries with structural overca-
pacity. 
This paper has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of discretionary 
fi scal policies in order to distinguish pros and cons of fi scal policy in stimulating the economy. 
It shows that it is extremely diffi cult to elaborate an unambiguous catalogue of measures defi n-
ing an “optimal” fi scal package.
Discretionary fi scal policy measures are usually advocated based on the claim that they have 
short-run benefi ts in the event of a crisis. Indeed, several recent studies seem to provide evi-
dence that additional government spending and/or tax cuts have a positive effect on aggre-
gate output in the short term. The most popular argument relies on the presence of liquidity-
constrained agents, whose consumption reacts strongly to tax reductions or government 
spending increases and whose share in total households may rise in times of fi nancial turmoil. 
Another explanation relates to the complementarity between public and private goods. 
Short-term costs of discretionary fi scal measures stem, fi rst and foremost, from increasing 
sovereign risk premia: bearing in mind default risk, increasing or perceived-as-unsustainable 
government debt can lead to a risk premium being charged on the interest on government 
debt to compensate for higher default risk crowding out private investment. An additional 
short-run consideration pertains to the link between fi scal policy and uncertainty. Automatic 
stabilizers, to the extent that they operate properly, can lower volatility and uncertainty in the 
economy, without introducing new policy uncertainties. This may not be the case for discre-
tionary fi scal policy. In this respect, random fi scal policies could increase economic uncer-
tainty, and thus damage economic activity. As the impact of different measures might depend 
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on expectations about the future, fi scal stimulus packages announced clearly and credibly are 
likely to be more effective. 
Among the requirements that fi scal measures should be “timely, targeted and temporary” 
(TTT), the implementation of the fi rst one—timeliness— is the least controversial criterion in the 
current situation. As regards the duration of measures, both temporary and more persistent 
measures may be defended depending on the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents in the 
economy, the reaction of long-term interest rates, and the expected duration of the adverse 
shocks hitting the economy. Targeting measures to some specifi c agents may be diffi cult in 
practice, given the uncertainty surrounding fi scal multipliers and the challenge of designing 
well-targeted fi scal stimulus packages. 
The structure of a fi scal stimulus plan should take into account several factors, such as: (i) a 
proper balance between the expected short-term positive effects (mainly demand-side) with 
anticipated costs (mainly longer-term supply side); (ii) the expected size of fi scal multipliers of 
various tools available; (iii) the degree of openness of the economy; (iv) the need to minimise 
distortions in the market mechanisms and, in the case of EU countries, the compliance with 
the EU single market rules. 
On balance, empirical studies fi nd that spending multipliers are higher than tax multipliers in the 
short term. This result could be rationalized as being consistent with the theoretical prediction 
that part of the higher disposable income from a tax cut is saved, while government purchases 
of goods and services affect aggregate demand directly in the longer term. The cumulative ef-
fect of tax measures usually grows with time, but the evidence that tax cuts are more effective 
than spending increases is mixed, especially when tax changes are temporary. Increases in 
government purchases of goods and services are found to work faster than other spending 
components, particularly in times of recession and low capacity utilisation, as they induce an 
immediate positive impact on aggregate demand. However, in the longer term, the distortions 
induced by these measures may result in a negative or, at best, insignifi cant impact. 
In addition to general factors, country specifi c features are also of major importance in assess-
ing the suitability of fi scal packages. While a given fi scal package may be deemed appropriate 
for a country with a low debt ratio and a structural budget surplus, the same package could 
easily lead to rising risk premia on interest rates and other detrimental effects in a country with 
an unfavourable starting fi scal position. The openness of the economy should be considered 
as well. A crucial aspect in this regard is the exit strategy of the adopted fi scal policy line. A 
strategy that preserves long-term fi scal sustainability by embedding expansionary fi scal meas-
ures in a credible medium-term consolidation framework is less likely to invoke adverse expec-
tation effects than a strategy based on permanent and uncompensated defi cit increasing 
measures which violates fi scal rules.
From a European perspective, the neglect of the European fi scal framework could even lead 
to negative spill-over effects on other EU member states if the credibility of the framework is 
damaged by individual member states’ actions. 
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